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Abstract 
This report outlines Explanation Construction Theory, a psychological theory of how people come to 
comprehend scientific explanations. Explanation Construction Theory has three components: (a) a 
theory of how scientific knowledge is represented in memory, (b) a taxonomy of different 
representations that can be formed in response to an encounter with a text presenting a theory, and (c) 
a set of factors that influence which of these representations will be constructed. 
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Constructing Scientific Explanations from Text: 
A Theoiy with Implications for Conceptual Change 
The purpose of this report is to outline Explanation Construction Theory, a psychological theory of how 
people come to comprehend scientific explanations. Explanation Construction Theory offers an account 
of how people construct an understanding of a scientific explanation when they encounter a text that 
presents the explanation. The text may be written or oral, and it may include illustrations. 
At present, Explanation Construction Theory should be regarded as a theory in progress. Empirical 
tests of many key components are currently being conducted, and the empirical data will undoubtedly 
point to changes in the theory. 
In its current form, Explanation Construction Theory has been developed to account for causal events. 
A causal event is an episode involving a change with a definable beginning and end. Examples of causal 
events include a meteor impact producing a mass extinction, a rock breaking a window, and sunlight 
causing a plant to grow. In each of these events, there is a beginning state (e.g., a meteor hurtling 
through space toward the earth), an ending state (a devastated planet with numerous species extinct), 
and a process that mediates the two (the meteor impact produces acid rain, extreme cold, and fires that 
kill off many species). 
In addition to knowledge about causal events, scientific knowledge includes knowledge about static and 
dynamic equilibria (Chi, de Leeuw, Chiu, & La Vancher, 1994; Iwasaki & Simon, 1994). In the future, 
I plan to extend the theory to static and dynamic equilibria. This report, however, is concerned only 
with knowledge about causal events. 
Explanation Construction Theory has three components: (a) a theory of how scientific knowledge is 
represented in memory, (b) a taxonomy of different representations that can be formed in response to 
an encounter with a text presenting a theory, and (c) a set of factors that influence which of these 
representations will be constructed. In this report, I will outline each of these components, and I will 
illustrate the three components by presenting examples from the domain of chemistry. I conclude by 
discussing some instructional implications of Explnation Construction Theory. 
Representations of Scientific Knowledge 
In Chinn (1994), I have proposed that scientific knowledge is represented in memory as sets of 
interlinked explanatory models. The proposed representation owes most to Forbus's (1984) qualitative 
process theory, Rajamoney & Koo's (1990) extension of qualitative process theory to microscopic 
models, Johnson-Laird's (1983) mental models, and the notion that mental models can be run as 
simulations (Gentner & Stevens, 1983). 
An explanatory model of a causal event in Explanation Construction Theory consists of a pair of linked 
mental models. One mental model in the pair is the theoretical model with theoretical entities that 
cannot be directly observed, such as atoms, electrons, photons, energy, and fields. The second mental 
model is the data model, which is a model of observable phenomena, such as the disappearance of water 
set out in a pan or the fire and hotness resulting from lighting a candle. The two models are connected 
with correspondence rules that specify the relations between the two models. 
The theoretical model and the data model are mental models containing entities situated in an 
imaginistic mental space (e.g., gas molecules far apart from each other flying about in space). However, 
much of the key information contained in the models is propositional and impossible to represent 
imaginistically (e.g., energy is conserved; there is nothing, rather than invisible air or ether, between the 
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molecules). The propositional information is combined with the entities so that a person can run the 
mental model as a simulation (e.g., in a model of evaporation, the faster moving water molecules at the 
surface escape into the air). 
Table 1 presents a detailed example of an explanatory model of evaporation. The model indicates an 
intermediate level of understanding of evaporation. The model is presented in purely verbal form, with 
the imagery-based elements redescribed verbally. The actual mental representation would place the 
entities (bowls of water, molecules moving in space) in spatial arrangements. 
[Insert Table 1 about here.] 
Data Models, Theoretical Models, and Correspondences 
Data Models 
Models of phenomena are models of observables; they are the data to be explained by the explanatory 
model. For evaporation, the macroscopic model describes the water and how it changes, as observed 
by the naked eye together with simple instruments such as thermometers. 
Theoretical Models 
Theoretical models explain the macroscopic phenomena by specifying mechanisms with unobservable 
entities. The theoretical model for evaporation employs atoms and molecules as entities. There are 
properties and changes involving individual molecules (e.g., escape into the air), and there are properties 
and changes involving aggregations of the molecules (e.g., heat energy as the sum of the kinetic energy 
of each individual molecule). 
Correspondences Between the Models 
A very important part of an explanation is the set of correspondence rules that link the explanatory 
model with the data model. The links are often nonintuitive. There is, for example, no obvious intuitive 
reason why temperature in a macroscopic model should correspond to average kinetic energy of 
molecules in the microscopic model. Indeed, many secondar school students believe that increasing 
temperature corresponds to individual molecules becoming hotter (Driver, Squires, Rushworth, & 
Wood-Robinson, 1994) or to a fluid heat flowing in between the molecules (Erickson, 1980). 
Components of Theoretical Models and Data Models 
A complete theoretical model or data model includes specification of the following: beginning entities 
with their properties, final entities and properties, the transformations that occur from the beginning to 
final states, a specification of the constraints on the process, and causal variables. Examples of these 
components for evaporation are shown in Table 1. 
Beginning and Final Entities and Properties 
Theoretical models specify theoretical entities and their properties in the initial and final states. Data 
models specify observable entities and their properties in the initial and final states. 
In both theoretical and data models, the initial and final states consist of a set of entities placed in the 
desired spatial arrangement. Each model specifies relevant properties of the entities; at least some of 
the properties are implicated in the changes that occur. The initial and final states need not be static 
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states. For instance, water molecules and gaseous molecules are in a dynamic equilibrium involving 
constant motion and constant movement back and forth across the state boundaries. 
Transformations 
The models at both the theoretical level and the data level clearly specify the changes that occur from 
the beginning to the final state. The data model specifies what changes occur without specifying how 
the changes occur. The theoretical model specifies step by step how the changes occur in terms of the 
theoretical entities. 
Constraints 
The theoretical model and data model each specify constraints that apply to the transformation. For 
instance, in the model of evaporation, one constraint that applies to both the theoretical level and the 
data level is the conservation of mass: The total mass of all entities in the system must remain constant. 
Some additional constraints that operate at the theoretical level in all chemical reactions are (a) 
individual atoms never change their mass and (b) individual atoms are neither created nor destroyed. 
Causal Variables 
Theoretical models and data models also indicate what variables play a causal role in the changes. 
There are two kinds of causal variables: causal variables internal to a model and causal variables 
revealed by contrastive models. 
Explanation Construction Theory assumes that learners learn that a variable is causal by noticing a 
contrast (cf. van Fraasen, 1980). For instance, a learner learns that temperature is causally related to 
evaporation in the phenomenon model by inspecting the contrast between evaporation at a high 
temperature and evaporation at a low temperature. 
Some contrasts occur within a single model (cf. Cheng, 1993). For instance, in the explanatory model 
of evaporation, it is only the fast-moving molecules moving upward at the surface of the water that 
escape to the air. The model contains fast-moving and slow-moving molecules, molecules at the surface 
and molecules below the surface, and molecules traveling in a variety of directions. Explanation 
Construction Theory postulates that the learner learns the causal effect of speed, location, and direction 
by contrasting the molecules that escape (fast-moving molecules moving upward at the surface) with 
several different types of molecules that do not escape (slow-moving molecules, molecules below the 
surface, and molecules moving sideways or downwards). These contrasts all exist within the single 
theoretical model. 
Other causal factors, however, are not revealed within this single explanatory model. Instead, learners 
must contrast two models across which one of these factors varies. For instance, the bond strength of 
water is constant within the explanatory model shown in Table 1. For a learner to notice the role of 
bond strength in evaporation rate, the learner must contrast this model of evaporation with a model of 
a substance with a stronger or weaker bond strength, such as isopropyl (rubbing alcohol). Isopropyl has 
much weaker intermolecular bonds so that the molecules escape to the air occurs much more quickly. 
By contrasting the explanatory model of isopropyl with the explanatory model of water, the learner 
apprehends the causal role of bond strength. 
Instances 
An explanatory model of evaporation either lists instances to which evaporation applies or links different 
models of evaporation as instances of evaporation. Successful learners may use additional instances of 
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an explanation in two ways. First, by comparing the current instance to an earlier instance, the learner 
may generalize those features that are common to the two instances (Ross & Spalding, 1991), such as 
the presence of molecules. Second, the comparison also allows the learner to identify factors, such as 
what the container is made of or whether the water is flowing, that are not causally relevant. In many 
models of learning, such as models of concept acquisition, irrelevant features are dropped from abstract, 
generalized representations. Explanation Construction Theory, however, hypothesizes that some 
irrelevant factors may be remembered and generalized to other processes, such as boiling or reactions. 
Connections with Contrastive Cases 
Experts may encode external causal contrasts such as bond strength as abstract variables within a single 
abstract model for evaporation; this is the approach used in Table 1. Novices, however, may need to 
begin by constructing separate representations for evaporation with weak bonds and evaporation with 
strong bonds and then linking these models in memory to show the causal role of bond strength. If so, 
then making connections with contrastive models should be crucial to learning all the factors that can 
influence a process such as evaporation. 
Theories and Recurrent Model Components 
According to Explanation Construction Theory, knowing a scientific theory means knowing a set of 
interrelated models (cf. Giere, 1988). For instance, knowing molecular theory means knowing molecular 
models for evaporation, melting, freezing, condensation, combustion reactions, endothermic solution 
reactions, exothermic solutions reactions, elastic repulsion, and many other processes. All of these 
models are united by a set of common underlying entities, common properties of entities, common 
processes, common constraints on processes, and correspondence rules that recur in numerous models. 
For example, the microscopic model of a liquid, with molecules moving past each other, constantly 
making and breaking weak intermolecular bonds, recurs in any model involving liquids. The 
correspondence rule linking temperature and average kinetic energy of molecules recurs in evaporation, 
melting, reactions of all sorts, friction, and many other models. The constraint that energy must be 
conserved recurs in every process. Processes such as bond-breaking, bond formation, and temperature 
increase through friction appear over and over. It is all of these recurring components of explanatory 
models that unify a theory. To learn a theory is to learn these recurring components and how they fit 
together in numerous models. 
Representations Formed upon Encountering a New Explanatory Model 
The second component of Explanation Construction Theory is a taxonomy of representations that people 
may construct when they encounter scientific theories that contradict their current ideas. Notice that 
constructing a representation for a theory does not entail believing that theory; a person can, for 
instance, construct a representation of the geocentric model of the solar system without believing it. 
According to Explanation Construction Theory, a person can construct any of four types of 
representation upon encountering a model that contradicts current beliefs: (a) the learner constructs 
no new representations, (b) the learner constructs a rote representation, (c) the learner updates the 
current model but does not construct a separate representation for the new model, and (d) the learner 
constructs an alternative representation for the new model. 
Constructing No Representation 
Sometimes learners make no attempt to construct any new representation of the theory. Instead, the 
learners ignore the new theory or use particular words within the model as cues that remind them of 
information irrelevant to the theory (Roth & Anderson, 1988). In neither case is a new model 
constructed. 
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Constructing a Rote Representation 
Learners may construct a rote representation of a scientific theory without understanding any of it. A 
rote representation is a representation that preserves superficial linguistic structures or pictorial elements 
but has no underlying meaning (see Brewer & Pani, 1983). 
Updating the Current Model 
Learners who update their current models do not attempt to understand the contradictory model as a 
model distinct from their own system of models. Instead, they take bits and pieces from the new model 
in order to update their old models. These learners process a text (oral or written) piece by piece, 
perhaps sentence by sentence or paragraph by paragraph. The learners do construct separate 
representations for each new piece of information, but the representation of each piece is fragmentary 
and is not integrated with the other pieces in a single coherent representation of the new model. 
Learners compare each piece of new information presented in the text with their old beliefs. Then the 
learners may choose to alter the old beliefs before going on to the next piece of new information. Thus, 
although the learner reads each piece of information, the learner makes no attempt to construct a 
complete, integrated representation of the alternative model. 
As the learner processes each piece of information, he or she may take any of these actions: (a) The 
learner may reject the new information as incorrect and maintain the old belief system without any 
change, (b) The learner may assimilate the new information by (mistakenly) interpreting the new 
information as being identical to information already present in the old belief system, (c) If the learner 
cannot understand the new information, the learner may discard it as incomprehensible and think about 
it no further, (d) The new information may lead the learner to modify the old belief system. 
Constructing an Alternative Model 
An individual's most sophisticated response upon encountering a new explanatory model (or set of 
explanatory models) that contradicts old beliefs is to try to construct a distinct, separate representation 
of the explanatory model. The individual attempts to keep the current model separate from the 
representation of the new model. Then the two models can be compared and evaluated in toto. 
An alternative representation differs from an updated representation in three crucial respects: 
(a) The learner suspends belief. 
(b) The learner constructs the representation using shared building-block concepts. 
(c) The learner leaves gaps where understanding is incomplete. 
Suspending belief. To construct an alternative model, learners must separate belief from understanding. 
An alternative theory may not be believable until the learner has had a chance to construct numerous 
explanatory models and see how the explanatory models explain a range of data. When belief is 
segregated from understanding, the learner is freer to incorporate elements into the new explanatory 
models that may at first seem absurd. 
Use of shared building-block concepts. It is widely accepted that new ideas are comprehended by 
integrating them with prior knowledge (e.g., Anderson & Pearson, 1984). But how could a learner ever 
come to understand a new theory that is fundamentally different from an old theory? How could 
concepts from the old theory be used to comprehend a new theory with incompatible concepts? The 
answer, according to Explanation Construction Theory, is that models in the new theory are often not 
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constructed from elements of the old theory; rather, models in the new theory are constructed from 
elements of knowledge that are common to both the old and new theories or from elements of 
knowledge that play no role in the old theory. 
As an illustration, consider a student who encounters a description of the molecular model of matter 
for the first time. The student's prior model of matter posits that matter is continuous and 
homogeneous. Then the student reads an account of the molecular theory, including the ideas that 
matter is constructed of tiny balls called molecules and that there is empty space between the molecules. 
The concepts tiny balls and empty space are building-block concepts that play no role at all in the old 
theory that matter is continuous. As long as students understand these concepts, they should be able 
to construct an alternative representation that is independent of the original theory. The accuracy of 
the representation depends on whether the text author and the reader share the same building-block 
concepts, not on whether they share the same theory. If the reader conceptualizes balls as footballs and 
empty space as always having some air in it, the reader's representation will be very different from the 
author's representation, but it will also be very different from the initial homogeneous model. Thus, new 
theories can be constructed from lower level, building-block concepts that either are not specifically part 
of the old theory or are shared by both the old and new theories. 
Gaps where knowledge is incomplete. Because a new alternative model may be complex, learners may 
find it nearly impossible to build up a complete model without a series of increasingly deep encounters 
with models in the theory. As the learner tries to understand new, contradictory model, there will be 
a need to leave gaps in the representation. For instance, the learner learning about evaporation may 
be unclear about where the escaped molecules go. The alternative representation will probably be 
corrupted if the learner wantonly imports prior knowledge to fill such gaps. 
Obstacles to Constructing an Alternative Model 
When a learner attempts to construct a representation for an alternative theory from a text, the 
constructed representation often differs from the writer's intended representation. Explanation 
Construction Theory assumes that writers who describe a theory intend the reader to acquire an 
understanding of that theory that is shared with the writer. Failures by the reader to understand what 
the writer intended could be revealed in a conversation between the reader and the writer, in which the 
conversants made repair moves such as "No, that's not what I was trying to say," "Actually, the molecules 
are moving all the time," or "So you mean that there is a vacuum between the molecules?" When no 
such repair moves occur, we may assume that the reader and writer hold identical representations of 
the theory. 
Explanation Construction Theory postulates three general types of discrepancy between the reader's 
representation and the writer's representation: omissions, importations, and distortions. To illustrate, 
I will refer to the explanation of evaporation shown in Table 1. 
Omissions of single explanation components. A omission occurs when the reader's representation of 
a model lacks components found in the writer's representation. For instance, secondary school 
chemistry students often fail to include "moving" as a property of molecules in solids, and they often fail 
to encode the conservation of molecules as a constraint on interactions. They may also omit from their 
model the correspondence between water vapor and humidity. Some students may omit the entire data 
model, never realizing what it is that the microscopic model is supposed to explain! 
One particularly important omission is the omission of a mechanism, as when a learner knows that 
molecules leave the water during evaporation but does not understand why this occurs. A related 
omission occurs when learners encode external causal factors but do not recognize how outcomes vary 
with those factors. For instance, learners may realize that bond strength has to be overcome during 
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evaporation but not that bond strength may vary, so that evaporation occurs more rapidly when the bond 
strength is low. 
Learners may construct a representation of a explanatory model but fail to construct additional 
explanatory models to which that core explanatory model can be linked. There are two main types of 
explanatory models that can be omitted. First, learners can omit contrastive models, which are 
hypothesized to be necessary for understanding the role of some causal variables. Second, learners can 
omit other instances to which the model applies. This can result in undergeneralization of the model. 
Importations. Importations are the opposite of omissions: The learner incorporates an inappropriate 
idea from old knowledge into a model. That is, the learner imports from old knowledge an idea that 
does not exist in the writer's model. Any model component can be imported. For instance, secondary 
school learners often assume that molecules in cold water have the property of being wet and being cold, 
just as macroscopic water does. These learners have imported the macroscopic properties of water into 
the theoretical model. Similarly, learners may interpret the "empty space" between molecules to be air. 
Mechanisms may also be imported, as when a learner who reads a text giving a sketchy, incomplete 
account of evaporation assumes that the mechanism for evaporation must be that the molecules 
disappear, or that some water molecules are lighter than others so that they belong in the air. 
Chi (1992) has argued that learning science is especially difficult when the learner's concepts belong to 
a different ontological category from the writer. For example, novices view concepts such as heat and 
energy are material substances, whereas scientists view heat and energy as a relations among material 
substances. In the view of Explanation Construction Theory, this leads novices to import material 
properties that do not belong in the scientists' model. 
Sometimes learners may import linked explanations that should not be linked to an explanation. One 
common importation of this sort is the importation of explanations to which the explanatory model 
should not apply, such as assuming that the mechanism that produces evaporation (escape of surface 
molecules) applies to boiling water, as well. 
Inappropriate linked instances can also be imported, as when a student connects state change processes 
such as boiling as instances of models of chemical reactions. Importing inappropriate instances means 
that the explanatory model is overgeneralized. 
Tagged and Untagged Omissions and Importations. Explanation Construction Theory makes a 
distinction between tagged omissions and importations and untagged omissions and importations. An 
untagged omission is one that the reader is unaware of; a tagged omission is one that readers 
consciously mark as being a gap their knowledge. An untagged importation is one that the learner 
makes without realizing it; a tagged importation occurs when the reader consciously decides to make 
an assumption, while realizing that the assumption may be unwarranted. Tagged omissions and 
importations may be easier to repair than untagged omissions, because the learner may set and maintain 
a goal of finding new information to fill the tagged gap or to check on the tagged importation. 
Distortions. Learners can also distort information that they encounter. For instance, students may read 
that water molecules behave as if they were hard and yet continue to believe that water molecules are 
soft. This is not a problem of omitting information or importing information. The information in the 
text is overridden. It is either ignored or changed, probably because it does not make sense to the 
learner. 
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Factors that Influence Which Representation Will Be Constructed 
The third component of Explanation Construction Theory is a specification of factors that are 
hypothesized to influence the construction of representations of new theories that contradict old beliefs. 
The theory postulates four classes of factors that can influence which representation is constructed: (a) 
the learner's goals and interests, (b) the learner's beliefs about the nature and structure of scientific 
knowledge, (c) the learner's naive beliefs about learning science, and (d) the fit between the information 
presented in the texts and the learner's prior knowledge. 
Goals and Interests 
Learners will construct a representation only if they have set themselves the goal of constructing a 
representation. To construct complete alternative models, learners must set themselves the goal of 
understanding how the new theory accounts for a variety of data. A useful way of promoting this goal 
is to have students explain many phenomena; their interest should be further whetted if many of the 
phenomena are drawn from everyday life. 
If the learner's initial theory is highly entrenched (see Chinn & Brewer, 1993), the learner may feel that 
it is not worth the trouble to learn a new theory that is obviously wrong. Thus, an entrenched initial 
theory may be a strong impediment to motivation. 
The Learner's Beliefs about the Nature and Structure of Scientific Knowledge 
A learner's beliefs about the nature and structure of scientific knowledge may affect learning. For 
instance, students who do not fully understand the distinction between data models and theoretical 
models will probably have difficulty learning scientific explanations (Kuhn, 1989). Students who do not 
understand that rival theories may exist and that these theories compete to try to explain a given body 
of data may fail to understand the need to keep new explanatory models distinct from old beliefs. 
Students who think that science is an accumulation of observable facts and vocabulary may have 
difficulty constructing scientific explanations (cf. Songer & Linn, 1991). Students who do believe that 
new scientific information must be consistent with what they already know may commit numerous 
importations and distortions. 
The Learner's Naive Theories of Learning 
Learners possess many beliefs about learning that could affect their ability to construct an accurate 
alternative model. Explanation Construction Theory hypothesizes that two beliefs may be particularly 
beneficial. The first is the belief that active explanation promotes understanding. The learner who does 
not actively strive to construct explanations may be particularly prone to omissions. The second 
important belief is the realization that one cannot learn a scientific model all at once; instead, it is 
necessary to leave gaps or sometimes make guesses until a time when additional information is given. 
Learners who tag their gaps and importations may be more likely to fill gaps and correct incorrect 
importations later on (cf. Chan, Burtis, Scardamalia, & Bereiter, 1992). 
The Fit Between the Information Presented in the Texts and the Learner's Prior 
Knowledge 
Mismatches between the information presented in the text and the learner's prior knowledge can cause 
omissions and importations to proliferate. One type of mismatch occurs, as many researchers have 
noted, when writers and readers assign qualitatively different meanings to terms. For the scientist, heat 
and energy are unsubstantial properties of matter; for the student, heat and energy may be fluid-like 
substances with weight. For the scientist, air consists of molecules with a vacuum between them; for 
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the student, air may be a homogenous substance with no mass. Obviously, in such situations, writers 
cannot use the terms heat, energy, or air without considerable explanation. Sentences such as "Heat 
flows from the warm water to the cold water" can only reinforce the child's misconception. The 
difficulties are not limited to technical terms; a text stating that water molecules "escape" into the 
atmosphere may lead learners to think that the atmosphere is the natural home to which water 
molecules want to return. Similarly, the phrase "the molecules in the water" may suggest to the child 
that water consists of generic molecules surrounded by models like raisins in a pudding. 
There are at least two possible remedies to such difficulties with language usage. One is to avoid using 
technical terms such as heat and energy and instead to retreat to a more theory-neutral vocabulary, at 
least for a while. Nontechnical terms that are misleading should be avoided altogether, and technical 
terms could be reintroduced later. A second remedy is to explain carefully how the scientific meaning 
differs from the learner's meaning. Although these approaches seem plausible, neither has been, to my 
knowledge, tested experimentally. 
Another type of text-reader mismatch occurs when texts are sketchy with respect to the reader's 
knowledge. Science textbooks typically present only a few of the numerous components of explanatory 
models. Such texts guarantee omissions, as learners simply cannot guess what goes in the gaps or do 
not realize that there are any gaps. At the same time, these texts encourage importations, as learners 
must import ideas to make even minimal sense of the text. For instance, a text that merely states 
"Evaporation occurs when the molecules in the water go up into the air" specifies no mechanism, leaving 
learners free to assign their own mechanisms. The obvious remedy is to make texts more explicit. For 
instance, a text explaining evaporation should clearly specify all of the components listed in Table 1; if 
the learner does not have a firm understanding of the microscopic models of liquids and gases, these 
should also be clearly specified. 
Undesired importations can be blocked in either of two ways: by using concepts inconsistent with that 
importation or by explicitly stating that the importation is unwarranted. For instance, students often 
import the property of wetness to describe individual molecules. To block this importation, the writer 
could assert that individual molecules are "hard and dry," which would be inconsistent with the property 
of wetness, or the writer could directly assert that individual molecules are not wet. These are instances 
of specific refutations, which are aimed at blocking specific importations that students may make. 
A common source of difficulty is students' failure to understand how the correspondence rules could 
be plausible. It seems implausible to young learners that hard molecules of water could correspond to 
something smooth, wet, and pourable. One solution is to provide additional information that can make 
this plausible. One could point out that whereas a bowl of marbles consists of hard particles that feel 
hard as a group, a bowl of canary seed consists of tiny spheres which, although hard and unpourable 
individually, feel smooth and can be stirred and poured as a group. This additional information could 
make it plausible that even smaller molecules could end up producing the properties possessed by water. 
Most textbooks, and indeed most researchers who do research on explanatory models (e.g., Mayer, 
1989), use single models in their instructional interventions. However, Explanation Construction Theory 
insists that novices cannot learn about the full range of causal factors without inspecting contrasting 
models. To understand how the presence of a solute affects evaporation, the learner must contrast a 
model of evaporation with a solute with a model of evaporation without a solute. Therefore, writers 
should present multiple, contrastive models. 
In a similar way, text authors can preclude omission of instances by specifying these instances. For 
instance, writers could point out that the evaporation model applies not only to drops of water on a 
kitchen pan but also puddles of water outside, ponds and lakes, the ocean, drops of gasoline spilled at 
a gas station, rubbing alcohol rubbed on the skin, sweat on the skin, and so on. The function of these 
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additional instances is the opposite of contrastive instances. These instances show what aspects of the 
current model are irrelevant, instead of which are causally relevant. Science educators frequently 
encourage the use of everyday examples to make sure that students learn to apply scientific theories to 
everyday life; the effectiveness of this highly plausible notion has not been systematically tested. 
For students to remedy incorrect importations and fill in omissions, it is necessary to revisit those 
explanations. Obviously, if a student constructs a faulty explanatory model and then never has occasion 
to think about that particular model again, the student will have no opportunity to improve the model. 
Therefore, it seems essential that students revisit explanatory models that they constructed previously 
so that they can work on them, revising and refining them. . 
Instructional Implications of Explanation Construction Theoiy 
The preceding analysis points to several instructional procedures that could help students learn new 
theories that contradict their own theories. 
One procedure is to encourage active reflection and explanation using the descriptions of models found 
in texts. If students actively reflect on the theory and use the theory to explain phenomena, they should 
eventually be able to achieve a model that approximates the model intended by the writer of the text. 
Generating explanations in addition to reading them should prevent omissions due to lazy processing. 
This recommendation follows that of researchers who have investigated the beneficial effects of 
explaining material to oneself as one studies (e.g., Bielaczyc, Pirolli, & Brown, 1994; Chi, Bassok, Lewis, 
Reimann, & Glaser, 1989; Chi et al., 1994). 
A second procedure is to revisit previously constructed alternative explanations after acquiring new 
knowledge to see if the new knowledge suggests any changes to those old explanations. It is essential 
to have multiple opportunities to construct accurate representations of complex explanatory models. 
A third procedure is to work with students to try to change their beliefs about the nature of science and 
their beliefs about learning science. If students become aware that science is not an enterprise of 
accumulating facts but rather an endeavor to construct explanatory models, which are often complex, 
then students should be more successful at learning these models. 
A fourth procedure is to present students with numerous explanations within a theory, including both 
contrastive explanations and additional instances. Contrastive explanations should alert students to 
causal factors that they would otherwise not notice. Additional instances should help students avoid 
overgeneralizing or undergeneralizing the explanations that they have learned. These assumptions are 
consistent with Spiro et al.'s (1987) advocacy of the use of multiple cases to promote flexible use of 
knowledge. 
The fifth procedure is to use highly explicit texts. It is possible that the main reason for the difficulty 
students have in learning scientific models is that they are never given clear presentations of these 
models! Because fragmentary descriptions of new theories are probably a main cause of omissions and 
importations, texts that clearly present all components of the model should facilitate construction of 
accurate models. To be explicit, texts should specify all of the components listed in Table 1. Texts 
should include the explanatory model, the data model, and the correspondences between the models. 
If necessary, the correspondences may be supported with information to make them plausible. The 
model should specify entities, properties, constraints, and internal causal contrasts. When contrastive 
models are provided, the contrasts should be highlighted. In addition, where necessary, the texts may 
include specific refutations. There is research showing that refutations are effective at promoting 
conceptual change (Guzzetti, Snyder, Glass, & Gamas, 1993), but the effectiveness of different types of 
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refutation has not been examined. Explanation Construction Theory proposes that specific refutations 
that block specific importations should be particularly effective. 
Summary and Conclusions 
This report has described Explanation Construction Theory, a theory of how people learn scientific 
theories from oral or written texts. Explanation Construction Theory includes a theory of how scientific 
knowledge is represented in memory, a taxonomy of the different kinds of representations an individual 
can construct upon learning about a new theory, and a set of factors that influences what kind of 
representation is constructed. Explanation Construction Theory makes several recommendations for 
instruction. 
Explanation Construction Theory is currently undergoing a series of empirical tests. One large study 
is underway to test the claim that explicit texts with multiple contrasts enhance understanding of difficult 
scientific models. A second group of studies is planned or underway to test Explanation Construction 
Theory's claims about the kind of information that should be presented in an explicit text. A third line 
of research investigates the distinction between updating the current model and constructing an 
alternative model. If the results of these studies provide support for Explanation Construction Theory, 
a very important claim will emerge: A central reason why students do not understand scientific theories 
is that they typically do not encounter descriptions of the theories that are sufficiently clear and explicit. 
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Table 1 
Explanation for Evaporation 
CATEGORIES Macro Level Correspondences Micro Level 
Beginning Water is in bowl. Macroscopic water corresponds to Water molecules in bowl, composed of 2 hydrogen 
Entities, Properties of water: the water molecules. (H) atoms and 1 oxygen (O) atom. 
Relations, and -fluid Properties: 
Properties -stirrable There are billions of molecules even -vacuum between molecules 
-pourable in the smallest drop of water one -distance between molecules of about one 
-spreads downward can see. molecular radius. 
and outward to fill -molecules constantly moving; they constantly 
spaces The properties of water and air are slide past and bump into each other 
-smooth and wet properties of all the molecules -speed of molecules varies around a mean 
-holds together unless together, not the properties of -motion is random in direction 
poured individual molecules. (This is -behave as if they were hard 
analogous to canary seed; each seed -intermolecular attractions between O atom of 
Air surrounds water is hard and round, but all together, one molecule and one of the H atoms of an 
and bowl. they approach fluidity.) adjacent molecule 
Properties of air: -molecules move as units 
-fluid Fluidity of waater derives from the 
-airy, wispy to the speed of the molecules relative to Gas molecules all around the water and pan 
touch the intermolecular attractions. molecules. There are molecules of four gases-
-space-filling nitrogen, oxygen, carbon dioxide, and water 
-doesn't seem very Air is "wispier," or less vapor. 
substantial substantial, than water because it Properties: 
has much more open space between -vacuum between molecules 
molecules and becuse there is no -distance between molecules of about ten 
intermolecular attraction between molecular radii 
the molecules. -molecules constantly moving; they move freely 
-speed of molecules varies around a mean 
Mass of water = sum of masses of -motion is random in direction 
liquid water molecules. -behave as if they were hard, perfectly elastic 
Mass of air = sum of masses of -no intermolecular attractions 
molecules that make up the air. -molecules move as units 
Changes Water level steadily 
decreases until the 
water disappears. 
Humidity in air 
increases. 
Temperatures of water 
decreases slightly. 
Decrease in water level corresponds 
to movement of water molecules 
from liquid to gas. 
Increase in humidity corresponds to 
increase in number of water 
molecules in the air. 
Decrease in temperature 
corresponds to decrease in average 
speed of water molecules and air 
molecules. 
Liquid water molecules escape from the surface of 
water and diffuse among molecules in the air. 
Number of water molecules in liquid decreases as 
number of water molecules in air increases. 
Kinetic energy of the molecules is converted to 
potential chemical energy. 
Because the fastest molecules at the surface of the 
water escape, the molecules left behind are, on the 
average, slower. 
Constraints Total mass remains 
constant. 
Number of molecules and atoms remains constant. 
Number of water molecules and air molecules 
remains constant. 
No molecule changes internal structure or 
individual properties. 





There is no water in the 
bowl. 
The humidity of the air 
is higher. 
The temperature of the 
air is lower. 
See above Same as beginning state, except: 
-There are more water molecules in the air. 
-There are no water molecules in the bowl. 






Presence of water If water molecules are moving upward and 
outward at a critical velocity, then the molecules 
escape and become water vapor molecules. Why: 
speed overcomes bond strength. 
If water molecules are moving sideways or 
downward at any velocity, then they remain in the 
liquid water. Why? Nowhere to escape. 
If water molecules move upward and outward at 
the surface of the liquid at a slow speed, then 
they do not escape from the surface. Why? The 
intermolecular bonds hold them. 
As molecules escape from the intermolecular 
bonds, they slow down because of the drag of the 
bonds as they are leaving. 







increases the rate of 
evaporation. 
Higher temperature corresponds to 
greater speed of molecules 
The molecules have a higher average speed. This means 
that there are also a larger number of molecules with 
speed great enough to escape the molecular bonds, so 
more molecules escape. 
Different substances 
evaporate at different 
rates. 
Different substances are composed 
of different molecules. The faster 
evaporation occurs with molecules 
with weaker intermolecular 
attraction; more molecules leaving 
the liquid means faster evaporation. 
Different substances have different intermolecular 
attractions. When intermolecular attractions are weak, it 
doesn't take much speed to overcome the force of the 
attraction, so many molecules leave the surface of the 
water. 
Increased surface area 
increases the rate of 
evaporation. 
Greater surface areas have more 
molecules on the surface. 
When more molecules are exposed to the air, it is more 
likely that fast-moving molecules will be at the surface; 
therefore, more molecules will leave the ater and go up 
into the air. 
Increased humidity 
decreases the rate of 
evaporation. 
Greater humidity corresponds to a 
greater concentration of water 
vapor in the air. Greater number of 
collisions of water vapor molecules 
with the water corresponds to more 
vapor molecules becoming attached 
to the liquid water molecules. More 
water molecules attached to the 
liquid molecules means a greater 
rate of condensation and thus a 
lower net rate of evaporation. 
With a greater number of water molecules in the air, there 
is an increased likelihood of a collision with other vapor 
molecules or with water molecules at the surface. When 
slower-moving water molecules that are part of the air 
collide with water molecules that are part of the liquid, 
then they stick together. 
Presence of solutes in 
the liquid slows the 
rate of evaporation. 
Dissolved substances correspond to 
molecules of the dissolved substance 
surrounded by liquid molecules. 
The decreased rate of evaporation 
corresponds to fewer molecules 
leaving the water. 
The molecules of the solute take up space at the surface of 
the liquid, which means that there is a smaller number of 
molecules that can leave the water. The solute molecules 
are also strongly attracted to the liquid molecules, so that 
it takes a much greater speed to overcome the attraction. 
Fewer liquid molecules have this great speed, so there are 
fewer molecules that go into the air. 
